编者按：清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波6月6日于《南华早报》发文，提出美伊战争的八大教训：特朗普的个人战争由全世界买单；军事打击解决不了政治问题；海上问题的根源出在陆上；斩首成功也打不垮一个国家；低成本不对称武器重塑战争形态；美国海上霸权从此开始衰落；盟友体系形同虚设，涣散无力；核武器对常规冲突的结果影响有限。
6月，美伊双方达成《伊斯兰堡谅解备忘录》，约定自6月14日晚间起，全面停止所有战线的军事行动。6月25日，周波在《南华早报》撰文评论。 南华早报网页截图
【翻译/北京对话 李琛峣】
伊朗战争已基本落下帷幕。尽管尘埃尚未落定，但有些教训已经清晰可见。
其一，美国总统特朗普以一己之私发动了一场以世界为代价的战争。中国先哲老子有言："兵者，不祥之器，非君子之器，不得已而用之。"特朗普曾承认自己不爱读书，恐怕对此并不知晓。很少有人真正理解他为何下令打击伊朗。或许是因为在委内瑞拉绑架总统马杜罗太过轻松，或许是以色列总理内塔尼亚胡的说服力太过强大。
俄罗斯对乌克兰的战争或可称为"普京的战争"，但四年过去了，普京的国内支持率仍维持在60%至75%的高位；而特朗普的支持率已跌破40%。短短四个月，特朗普挥霍了数十亿美元纳税人的钱，消耗了美军大量库存，还透支了盟友关系，所得却微乎其微。他与伊朗签署的停火谅解备忘录，不过是把一次代价高昂的失误粉饰成外交胜利。
RealClearPolitics汇总的特朗普民调 社交媒体
其二，军事打击解决不了政治问题。克劳塞维茨说过，战争是政治的延续。但战争并不能保证政治问题得到解决。停火之后，伊朗总统马苏德·佩泽希齐扬表示，伊朗虽不会发展核武器，但保留铀浓缩的主权权利。听起来有点耳熟？那是因为我们又回到了原点。
反观美国前总统奥巴马2015年与伊朗达成的协议，正如他近日所指出的，"将伊朗97%的浓缩铀运出去了"。"毫无疑问，协议是有效的，"他补充道，"而且我们不必杀害大量的人，也不必封锁霍尔木兹海峡。"
其三，海上问题的根源出在陆地。美国海军未能封锁和控制这条至关重要的水道，而伊朗却牢牢掌控着海峡北岸。其岸基反舰导弹、近海无人机、快速攻击艇和陆基雷达监视网络覆盖了这条咽喉要道的每一寸。对美国而言，唯有大规模陆上轰炸或地面入侵才能消除伊朗的岸基威胁--而这一步骤恐将引发局势升级，特朗普明智地没有采取。
其四，"斩首"军事策略并非百试百灵。据报道，过去二十年内，以色列通过秘密行动和战时打击，已消灭了数十名伊朗核心人物--包括顶尖核科学家、革命卫队高级指挥官和国家安全领导人。然而，这些打击从未真正摧毁伊朗的核野心。
相反，它们激发了伊朗的民族凝聚力，引发了一轮又一轮跨境报复，加剧了中东动荡，给以色列和美国带来了长期的战略损失。若说有什么变化，那就是伊朗看起来比以往更加强大。
其五，低成本不对称技术正在重塑全球战争形态。廉价、易得的军事系统正在改写战场规则。这一趋势在2020年纳卡冲突和俄乌冲突中已显露端倪，在最近的伊朗战事中同样有所体现。伊朗用廉价无人机、商业卫星图像和基础网络工具来对冲美国的技术优势。
在乌克兰和中东得到淬炼的人工智能增强型无人机与导弹战术，预计将在全球扩散。更重要的是，伊朗战争开创了一种新的战争模式：一个中等强国可以通过挟持全球供应链来对抗超级大国。如此一来，地区冲突足以让整个世界陷入瘫痪。
其六，美国的海上霸权接近尾声，其衰落一目了然：美国海军舰队规模大幅缩水，从二战后约7000艘锐减至如今不足300艘。投入不足的美国造船业无力以可承受的成本替换其日益老化的战舰。
与此同时，廉价无人机、水雷、无人舰艇和导弹增强了地区大国的实力。尽管其空军和海军几乎被全歼，伊朗仍能以廉价水雷和岸基反舰导弹瘫痪全球20%的海运石油贸易。
展望未来，人们不禁要问，美国海军如何能同时维系在波斯湾、西太平洋和印度洋的军事行动。下次美国再宣布"航行自由"行动时，请忍住不要发笑。
美国海军导弹驱逐舰"拉斐尔·佩拉尔塔"号（DDG 115）正在执行美国对伊朗港口的封锁。（2026年4月26日）
其七，美国的盟友如同一盘散沙，主人根本拢不住它们。没有一个盟友挺身而出；法国、英国、德国、意大利和荷兰等国，只承诺在战争宣布结束后参与扫雷。可如果盟友只在战争结束后才现身，它们的意义何在？
美国国防部长赫格塞斯将北约盟友按兵不动斥为"可耻"，并威胁要大幅削减在欧洲的驻军。如果说这证明了美国没有盟友就打不了仗，那同样也证明了盟友未必会为美国而战。如果没有人愿意在与伊朗的战争中提供军事支持，那又怎会有人愿意在与中国远为激烈的冲突中站在美国一边？
最后，核武器在有限战争和不对称战争中的相关性已然减弱。拥核国家未必就因此更强。
美国虽然拥有核武器，但自1975年越南战争以来再未赢得过一场决定性的胜利；俄罗斯拥有核武器，也未能为在阿富汗或乌克兰的战场获胜； 而伊朗则并未因为美国摧毁了其核设施就不堪一击。
核武器在现代战争中失去相关性，对无核国家而言是个好消息。对于那些寻求核保护伞庇护、或渴望拥核的国家，这一点也值得深思。
原文：
The war in Iran is effectively over. Although the dust has yet to settle, some lessons are already visible.
First, US President Donald Trump has waged a personal war at the world's expense. Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu warned that arms are ill-omened tools, employed only as a last resort. Trump, who has admitted he doesn't like to read, may not realise this. Few people know why he ordered a strike on Iran. Maybe kidnapping president Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela was too easy or Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was too persuasive.
Russia's war on Ukraine may be described as "Putin's war" but four years on, the Russian president's domestic approval ratings remain high at around 60-75 per cent while Trump's have plunged to below 40 per cent. After just four months, Trump has squandered billions of taxpayer dollars, depleted US military stockpiles and strained alliance ties - all for very little gain. His ceasefire memorandum of understanding with Iran is spinning a costly misstep as a diplomatic win.
Second, military strikes cannot fix political problems. Clausewitz argued that war is a continuation of politics. But war does not guarantee a settlement to political questions. Post-ceasefire, Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian said that while Iran would never develop nuclear weapons, it retained its sovereign right to enrich uranium. Sound familiar? That's because we are back to square one.
Compare that with former US president Barack Obama's 2015 deal with Iran which, as he recently pointed out, "got 97 per cent of their enriched uranium out". "There's no dispute that it worked," he added. "And we didn't have to kill a whole bunch of people or shut down the Strait of Hormuz."
Third, the solution to problems at sea lies on land. Contrast the US Navy's failure to blockade and control the vital waterway with Iran's domination of the northern coastline of the strait. Its coastal anti-ship missiles, offshore drones, fast-attack craft and land-based radar surveillance networks cover every inch of the chokepoint. For America, full-scale land bombardment or a ground invasion would be the only way to eliminate Iran's coastal threats - a step Trump rightly refuses for fear of escalation.
Fourth, a "decapitation" military strategy is not a silver bullet. In the last two decades, Israel's covert and wartime strikes reportedly eliminated dozens of core Iranian figures, spanning top nuclear scientists, senior Revolutionary Guard commanders and national security leaders. Yet these strikes have never crippled Iran's nuclear ambition.
Instead, they encouraged Iran's national solidarity, fuelled cycles of cross-border retaliation, destabilised the Middle East and imposed long-term strategic losses on Israel and the United States. If anything, Iran looks stronger than before.
Fifth, low-cost asymmetric tech is reshaping global warfare. Inexpensive, accessible military systems are rewriting battlefield rules. This trend, visible in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Ukraine war, also surfaced in the latest Iranian battles. Iran uses cheap drones, commercial satellite imagery and basic cyber tools to offset America's technological supremacy.
The AI-enhanced drone and missile tactics refined in Ukraine and the Middle East are expected to proliferate worldwide. Crucially, the Iran conflict pioneered a new war model: a middle power can hold global supply links hostage to counter a superpower. In this way, regional conflict can paralyse the whole world.
Sixth, America's maritime hegemony is coming to an end. The decline is obvious: the US naval fleet has shrunk drastically, from about 7,000 vessels right after the second world war to fewer than 300 today. The underinvested US shipbuilding industry is unable to replace its ageing warships affordably.
Meanwhile, cheap drones, sea mines and unmanned naval vessels and missiles have bolstered the strength of regional powers. Despite having its air force and navy almost wiped out, Iran still managed to paralyse 20 per cent of the global seaborne oil trade with cheap mines and shore-based anti-ship missiles.
Looking ahead, one wonders how the US Navy can simultaneously sustain its commitments across the Gulf, Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. The next time the US declares a freedom of navigation operation, try not to laugh.
Seventh, US allies are cats that cannot be herded by their master. No ally stepped forward; some, like France, Britain, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, only committed to clearing sea mines after the war was declared over. But what is the importance of allies if they only show up after the war?
US defence secretary Pete Hegseth described the inaction of America's Nato allies as "shameful" and threatened to slash troop deployments across Europe. If this is proof the US cannot fight its wars without its allies, it is also evidence that its allies won't necessarily fight for America. If no one offered military support in the war with Iran, why would anyone stand with America in a far more intense conflict with China?
Finally, nuclear weapons are irrelevant in the limited and asymmetric nature of modern warfare. Countries are not necessarily stronger because of nuclear weapons.
For all its nuclear weapons, the US has not decisively won a war since before Vietnam in 1975; neither has the possession of nuclear weapons delivered victory for the Russians in Afghanistan or Ukraine. Iran does not appear weakened just because America has destroyed its nuclear facilities.
That nuclear weapons have lost their relevance in modern warfare is good news for non-nuclear-weapon states. It is also food for thought for those seeking protection under a nuclear umbrella or aspiring towards nuclear weapons of their own.
